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I. INTRODUCTION
Government contracts occupy a special place in the law. Because it
generally has been thought that the government is vested with "far greater
power with respect to [government] contractors than it is with respect to
others,"' government contracts have become a vehicle for implementing a
variety of social programs. By imposing contractual obligations on private
employers who choose to contract with the federal government, the
executive branch has developed an elaborate program designed to provide
equality in employment opportunities. That program is the focal point of
this Article.2
Executive Order 112463 is the nucleus of the federal antidiscrimina-
tion program. Generally, the Order requires: (1) that all government
contracts contain a clause that prohibits employers from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and (2) that
government contractors take "affirmative action" to ensure non-
discrimination.4 Executive Order 11246 also requires that contractors
* Associate, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio; J.D., Ohio State Univ., 1973.
** Associate, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio; J.D., Case Western Reserve Univ., 1976.
1. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437, 440 (D.D.C. 1979).
2. Several courts have addressed the question of whether the Executive has the power or
discretion to carry out the social objective of achieving equality of opportunity in employment by
imposing nondiscrimination clauses in government contracts. These courts have generally concluded
that such power "seems to be authorized by the broad grant of procurement authority." Contractors
Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,170 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See
also United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacatedandremanded
on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978). For purposes of this discussion, the authors have assumed that
the Executive has the power to carry out such social objectives. This Article questions only the manner
in which the Secretary of Labor purports to enforce the contractual requirement of equal employment
opportunity.
The scope of this Article is limited to a discussion of the obligations of those employers who have a
contractual relationship with the government. Any rights or obligations imposed by virtue of an
employeres receipt of federal funds for reasons unrelated to the existence of a government contract are
beyond the scope of this Article.
3. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,139 (1965). The full text of Exec. Order No. 11246, as amended, can be found
in LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 230 1, and the text of Exec. Order No. 11478,34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969),
which superseded Part I of Exec. Order No. 11246, in LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2311. Exec. Order
No. 12086. 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979), amended Exec. Order No. 11246 by consolidating the authority for
administration and enforcement of the antidiscrimination provisions in the Secretary of Labor.
4. Section 202(1) of Exec. Order No. 11246, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2301, requires the
following clause be included in all government contracts except those exempted from the Order's
coverage:
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
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comply with the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of
Labor,5 who is charged with administration and enforcement of the
Order.6
The Secretary, through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP), has issued regulations7 that call for compliance
reviews of the affirmative action programs established by employers8 to
meet the requirements of the Order. In the event of noncompliance with
the dictates of the Order, the regulations provide for extra-judicial9
resolution by means of "conciliation agreements" between the contractor
and OFCCP.10 These agreements provide for, among other things, "such
remedial action as may be necessary to correct the violations and/ or
employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action
shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or
transfer;, recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other
forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor
agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment,
notices to be provided by the contracting officer, setting forth the provisions of this
nondiscrimination clause.
5. Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202(4), LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2301.
6. Id. § 201.
7. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20 to -1.32 (1979).
8. The regulations require certain employers to develop a written affirmative action compliance
program that contains specific data and goals for achieving, inter alia, sexual and racial balance in the
employer's workforce. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40, -250.5, -741.5 (1979).
9. The term "extra-judicial," as used in this Article, refers to any action other than a suit brought
in federal court. It includes conciliation as well as quasi-judicial administrative proceedings conducted
by an administrative law judge pursuant to 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-30.1 to -30.30 (1979).
10. The regulations covering conciliation agreements were amended in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg.
77,000, 77,002. As amended, they provide as follows:
§ 60-1.33 Conciliation agreements.
(a) If a compliance review, complaint investigation or other review by OFCCP or its
representative indicates a material violation of the equal opportunity clause, and (1) if the
contractor, subcontractor or bidder is willing to correct the violations and/or deficiencies,
and (2) if OFCCP or its representative determines that settlement (rather than referral for
consideration of formal enforcement) is appropriate, a written agreement shall be required.
The agreement shall provide for such remedial action as may be necessary to correct the
violations and/or deficiencies noted, including, where appropriate (but not necessarily
limited to), remedies such as back pay and retroactive seniority.
(b) The term "conciliation agreement" does not include "letters of commitment" which are
appropriate for resolving minor technical deficiencies.
§ 60-1.34 Violation of a conciliation agreement or letter of commitment.
(a) When a conciliation agreement has been violated, the following procedures are
applicable:
(1) A written notice shall be sent to the contractor setting forth the violations alleged
and summarizing the supporting evidence. The contractor shall have 15 days from receipt of
the notice to respond, except in those cases in which such a delay would result in irreparable
injury to the employment rights of affected employees or applicants.
(2) During the 15-day period the contractor may demonstrate in writing that it has not
violated its commitments.
(3) If the contractor is unable to demonstrate that it has not violated its commitments, or
if the complaint alleges irreparable injury, enforcement proceedings may be initiated
immediately without issuing a show cause notice or proceeding through any other
requirement contained in this chapter.
(b) If the contractor has violated a letter of commitment, the matter shall be handled, where
appropriate, pursuant to 41 CFR 60-2.2(c) or 41 CFR 60-4.8. The violation may be corrected
through a conciliation agreement, or an enforcement proceeding may be initiated.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.33 to -1.34. OFCCP has also issued proposed amendments to § 60-1.26, which
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deficiencies noted, including, where appropriate, remedies such as back
pay and retroactive seniority."' "1
The alternative to settlement through a conciliation agreement is
administrative enforcement proceedings, which ultimately could lead to
the imposition of severe sanctions, including cancellation of all existing
contracts and debarment of the contractor.' 2 Since government contrac-
tors rely heavily on the income derived from government contracts,
contract cancellation, debarment, or both, can have a devastating
impact. 3 When faced with a "show cause" letter14 alleging a violation of
one or more of the provisions of Executive Order 11246 or the regulations
thereunder, most contractors accordingly choose the less expensive and
more expeditious route of settlement. 5 As a result, back pay awards,
usually essential to any settlement, have become an important part of
equal employment opportunity enforcement. This Article will examine the
validity of extra-judicial imposition of back pay by OFCCP. The inquiry
delineates the procedural requirements which must be followed in negotiating a conciliation
agreement. If the amendments are adopted, § 60-1.26 will provide as follows:
§ 60-1.26 Conciliation agreements.
(a) A conciliation agreement is a written agreement between OFCCP and a contractor by
which the contractor undertakes specific obligations to correct or remedy noncompliance
with the Order or with sections 402 or 503. A conciliation agreement normally is required
where a compliance review, complaint investigation or some other review discloses violations
of the Order of sections 402 and 503, and (1) the contractor is willing to correct the violations
or deficiencies and (2) OFCCP determines that a settlement (rather than formal enforcement)
is appropriate. The agreement shall provide for the remedial relief necessary to correct the
violations or deficiencies which may include priority rights to hire or promotion, training,
back pay, front pay and retroactive seniority, etc., for an affected class or for individuals, as
appropriate.
(b) A conciliation agreement shall include (1) a statement of each deficiency or violation; (2)
the corresponding precise remedial action to be taken and a timetable for implementation; (3)
a requirement for periodic reporting to OFCCP as to implementation of the agreement, if
appropriate; and (4) a copy of the notice to show cause or notice of violation when such has
been previously issued.
(c) A conciliation agreement is effective when it has been signed by the contractor and the
proper Assistant Regional Administrator, OFCCP, unless, within 45 days of receipt from the
Assistant Regional Administrator, the Director rejects the agreement.
(d) Conciliation agreements shall not be entered into after enforcement proceedings have
been initiated. Settlement of enforcement proceedings by the Office of the Solicitor normally
will be by consent decree.
(e) Letters of commitment, in lieu of conciliation agreements are appropriate for resolving
minor technical deficiencies.
44 Fed. Reg. 77,006,77,012-13(1979). According to the accompanying comments, the section"codifies
existing OFCCP practices and procedures." Id. at 77,007.
11. Section 60-1.33, 44 Fed. Reg. 77,002 (1979) (emphasis added). The regulations have
provided for a back pay remedy since 1977. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.26, -2.1 (1977).
12. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.26(a)(2), -1.26(d) (1979).
13. Consider, for example, the possibility of survival of a financial institution if its federal
insurance is withdrawn. Cf. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 558 (N.D.
Ill. 1979).
14. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c) (1979).
15. In fiscal year 1979, OFCCP claims to have collected nearly $9.3 million in equal opportunity
settlements. "more than twice the amount collected for workers since fiscal 1978." 103 LAB. REL. REP.
48 (BNA) (1980). Out of that amount, back pay awards, payable to more than 2,100 persons,
constituted more than S3.7 million. Not included in the figures was the $5.2 million back pay award
obtained from Uniroyal, Inc. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-17, 18 (October 23, 1979). Thefull text of the
Uniroyal settlement agreements is printed at DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-I (October 29, 1979).
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will focus on OFCCP's power under Executive Order 11246, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,16 and constitutional due process principles.
This Article also will examine the back pay regulations promulgated under
Executive Order 11246 to determine whether OFCCP's enforcement
measures are valid in light of the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
17
II. THE SEARCH FOR A SUBSTANTIVE NEXUS
Any analysis of the validity of an administrative regulation must
begin with the principles established in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown."8 In
Chrysler the Supreme Court set forth three requirements that must be
satisfied if a regulation is to have the "force and effect of law": (1) the
regulation must be a substantive or "legislative-type" rule; (2) it must be
rooted in a congressional grant of authority; and (3) it must be
promulgated in accordance with any procedural standards established by
Congress. 19 Accordingly, if the OFCCP back pay regulations are to pass
muster, they must satisfy each of these requirements.
There is little question that the OFCCP regulations satisfy the first
criterion. The Court has defined a substantive rule as one that "affect[s]
individual rights and obligations." 20 The millions of dollars of liability that
have been imposed upon contractors 21 clearly bring the regulations within
the ambit of this definition. Compliance with the remaining requirements,
however, is a much closer question. This section will focus on the existence
of the requisite relationship to a congressional grant of authority-that is,
whether there is a sufficient "substantive nexus" between the OFCCP
regulations and an enactment of Congress that authorizes the regulations.
Consideration of the procedural requirements will be deferred to section
111.22
A. The Executive Order as Authority for the Collection of Back Pay
Executive Order 11246 contains an entire subpart delineating specific
sanctions and penalties available to the Secretary of Labor for
enforcement of the Order.23 These enforcement tools include: (1)
publication of the names of noncomplying contractors; (2) referral to the
Department of Justice for appropriate enforcement; (3) referral to the
16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in various parts of 42 U.S.C.).
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
18. 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (a case arising under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
19. Id. at 301-03.
20. Id. at 302, quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974).
21. For example, the $5.2 million settlement entered into by Uniroyal consisted "largely of back
pay." DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 210 (Oct. 29, 1979).
22. See text accompanying notes 134-257 infra.
23. Subpart D of Exec. Order No. 11246, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2304-05.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or to the
Department of Justice for investigation under Title VII; and (4)
withdrawal of government contracts from a contractor until the contractor
has satisfied the Secretary that it "has established and will carry out
personnel and employment policies in compliance with the provisions of
the Order."
The Secretary has advanced the withdrawal power, found in section
209(a)(6) of the Order 4 as one source of his regulatory power.25 In
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall,26 however, the court sustained the objection of
Uniroyal, a government contractor, that a debarment order containing
only the language of section 209(a)(6) was "unduly vague, violate[d] due
process, and permit[ted] arbitrary and capricious action." 27 In response to
the secretary's position that section 209(a)(6) granted to him the discretion
to impose "unspecified substantive requirements, 28 the court, holding
such a broad interpretation of the language of section 209(a)(6) to be
impermissible, stated that:
[W]hatever may be the authority of the Secretary to impose substantive
conditions upon a contractor who has been debarred for failing to comply
with substantive non-discrimination provisions of the Executive Order, the
Court concludes that he has no such authority where, as here, the contractor
was debarred solely for failure to comply with discovery orders. To construe
the Executive Order, the regulations, and the Secretary's powers more
broadly would raise serious problems of due process and would open the door
wide to arbitrary action. The government cannot bootstrap its way from the
failure of a contractor to comply with a discovery order to the imposition of
substantive affirmative action requirements. Further, a party must be told
more than that, in order to be removedfrom a government blacklist, it must
satisfy an administrative official of its compliance with unknown, unspecified,
and unpredictable conditions.
29
Therefore, while section 209(a)(6) may be a source of authority for the
back pay regulations, any regulatory sanctions following from it must be
limited to specific requirements that are imposed only for substantive
24. Section 209(a)(6) provides as follows:
In accordance with such rules, regulations, or orders as the Secretary of Labor may issue or
adopt, the Secretary of the appropriate contracting agency may:
(6) Provide that any contracting agency shall refrain from entering into further contracts,
or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any noncomplying
contractor, until such contractor has satisfied the Secretary that such contractor has
established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with the
provisions of this Order.
25. See, e.g.. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437 (D.D.C. 1979).
26. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437 (D.D.C. 1979).
27. Id. at 445. The case originated when the Secretary debarred Uniroyal for failing to comply
with a discovery order issued in connection with a proceeding under Exec. Order No. 11246. See 41
C.F.R. §§ 30.9 to 60-30.11 (1979).
28. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 445 (D.D.C. 1979).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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violations. The type of bootstrap regulations that are currently in force
arguably cannot pass this test.
30
The Secretary also has claimed that the back pay regulations are
authorized by section 201 of the Order, which provides as follows:
The Secretary of Labor shall be responsible for the administration and
enforcement of Parts II and III of this Order and shall adopt such rules and
regulations and issue such orders as he deems necessary and appropriate to
achieve the purposes thereof.
31
The mere authorization to issue rules to implement the Order,
however, is not sufficient to give those regulations the force and effect of
law.32 It still is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and
some congressional delegation of authority.33
It is generally accepted that Executive Order 11246 is authorized by
the broad grant of procurement authority vested in the Executive.34 Within
this broad grant, the social objectives of the Order have been rationalized
on the basis that the government's interest in procurement is to see "that its
suppliers are not over the long run increasing its costs and delaying its
programs by excluding from the labor pool available minority
workmen. 35 If this rationale is accepted, it is plainly inconsistent to
assume that the back pay regulations, with their enormous impact on the
contractors' costs and the resultant increase in the cost of supplies to the
government, are within the scope of presidential action authorized by the
procurement statutes.
36
B. The 1964 Legislative History of Title VII as Authority
for the Back Pay Regulations
Although Executive Order 11246 preceded the Civil Rights Act of
30. Interestingly, the Secretary has stated that "[f]ailure to provide back pay relief would
preclude the contractor from being reinstated under [section 209(a)(6)]." 44 Fed. Reg. 77,000, 77,000
(1979). Arguably, this language can be expanded to include back pay. However, under the
pronouncement of the Uniroyal court, requirements of this type would have to be limited to instances
in which a finding of discrimination has been made and back pay has been awarded.
31. LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2301.
32. In Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437,440 (D.D.C. 1979), the District
Court for the District of Columbia noted that § 201 grants broad authority to the Secretary. See also
Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 472 F. Supp. at 88 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3107 (1979).
33. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
34. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd,
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979) (questioning the validity of contractually implementing social programs but providing no
answer to the question).
35. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
36. For a more expansive analysis of the drawbacks of relying on the procurement power as the
authority behind the back pay regulations, see Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion at 44-
47, Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 558, (N.D. 111. 1979) (hereinafter
Harris Trust Memorandum).
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1964, 37 the legislative history of the Act reveals Congress' awareness of the
existence of the Order and the limitations on the enforcement authority of
the Order. Significantly, the original bill empowered the President to use
his contracting powers to impose back pay. This approach was rejected,
however, after numerous objections that a grant of the proposed powers to
the President would "make the Executive branch of the Government the
law makers, the judge, the jury and the executioner." 38
The legislative history also leaves little doubt that Congress intended
that all remedies, including back pay, would be imposed only through
litigation in the federal courts. Congress gave the EEOC and individual
plaintiffs power to seek redress for employment discrimination through
litigation, but refused to grant the EEOC the authority to enforce any
sanctions or to award any relief, except by voluntary agreement.39 It thus is
evident that, in 1963, Congress, cognizant of the enforcement authority
already vested in the Executive through the procurement statutes,
considered and flatly rejected Executive enforcement in the employment
discrimination field.
C. The Legislative History of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII
as a Basis for the Regulations
A proposal before the Senate in 1972 would have transferred all
functions of OFCCP to the EEOC. In defeating this bill, opponents
revealed that Congress understood the separate functions of the two
agencies and recognized that the only remedy available under Executive
Order 11246 was contract debarment.40
The comments of then EEOC Chairman Brown in his testimony
before the Senate Labor Subcommittee further underscores the division of
enforcement power. Regarding the proposed transfer of OFCCP
functions, Brown commented:
I can foresee serious problems arising as regards to investigations,
remedies and open conflicts with provisions of Title VII . . . . For example,
while an individual may sue under Title VII to have an individual grievance
redressed, under the provisions of the executive order the proper remedy is
contract debarment not individual redress. Also, the difference between the
two remedies will probably necessitate different burdens of proof and
differing emphasis on particular kinds of violations.4'
37. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 stat. 241 (1964) (codified in various parts of 42 U.S.C.).
38. Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 327, 331, 335, 342 (1963); Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judicia. 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114-18, 1476-84 (1963). For a more detailed discussion of this area, see
Harris Trust Memorandum, supra note 36.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
40. For example, the supporters of the bill stated: "[Tihe compliance program will be greatly
strengthened if alternative remedies are made available. The only remedy currently available to the
OFCC is contract debarment .. " 117 CoNG. REC. 31961 (1971) (emphasis added).
41. 118 CONG. REC. 1393 (1972) (emphasis added).
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The legislative history of the 1972 amendments also reveals Congress'
grave concern over due process requirements, a concern that ultimately led
to the defeat of an amendment that would have empowered the EEOC to
issue cease and desist orders. There were three primary reasons for the
refusal:
First, the Federal Court enforcement would provide the essential safeguards
of due process and an impartial tribunal thereby avoiding any biased findings
by a zealous agency charged with one particular goal. Second, Court
enforcement would allow use of the judicial expertise built up in years of
resolving similar complex questions. Third, allowing retrospective remedies
such as back pay to be sought only in judicial proceedings would avoid the
abrogation of due process rights of the defendant occasioned by merger of
judicial, prosecutorial and investigatory functions in a single administrative
agency.4
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments thus neither supports
an assertion that substantive power has been delegated to the President,
nor does it substantiate the Secretary's assertion of broad power to
promulgate the back pay regulations. Indeed, because Congress, through
the 1972 amendments, expressed a firm conviction to deny the delegation
of such power both to the Executive and to any administrative agency
created by congressional design, the legislative history leads to a contrary
conclusion. More importantly, the congressional insistence that any
determination of retrospective remedies for employment discrimination,
including back pay, be made by the courts highlights Congress' awareness
of the separation of powers in this area.
D. The Back Pay Regulations and Due Process Considerations
Even if the necessary legislative grant of authority were established,
the back pay regulations must be examined in light of the due process
protections afforded by the Constitution.43 The only case that, to date, has
42. Harris Trust Memorandum, supra note 36 at 36 (citations omitted). Other strong evidence of
the concern of Congress in maintaining constitutional due process protections are noted in this Brief.
43. Senator Brock's statements during the debates regarding the proposal to give EEOC cease
and desist powers underscore the importance of due process considerations in the context of this
Article:
Mr. President, this nation was founded on the philosophy of due process of law. A man
accused must be given the right to go before a jury of his peers and plead his case-and be
judged by his neighbors, right or wrong.
Today we are debating legislation that threatens to undermine this very philosophy.
The Equal Employment Opportunity bill actually allows this regulatory commission to
put agents into the field who have the authority to go into a small business and say "Mr., I
don't like what you are doing, it is discrimination, you are guilty, you are fined and don't
bother to plead innocent because there is no appeal, my decision is final."
If we allow this legislation to pass with this authority, we will be creating a commission
that will send bureaucrats, who have been elected by no one, out to serve as policemen,judge,
jury, and prosecutor, all rolled into one.
No judge or jury, just a bureaucrat with the power to judge and destroy.
This uncontrollable regulatory authority in the EEOC bill is a violation of every tenet
of America. There is simply no excuse for Congress to delegate this kind of raw power to this
agency.
The Federal Government does not have the right to say to Americans, under any
[Vol. 41:401
1980] BACK PAY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 409
addressed this question, Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Marshall,44 is
inconclusive. In Harris Trust, OFCCP had conducted several reviews of
the bank's affirmative action program and had notified the bank that it was
not in compliance with Executive Order 11246. Shortly thereafter,
OFCCP filed an administrative complaint against the bank, allegi.g
various discriminatory employment practices and praying for an order "(1)
enjoining [the bank] from failing and refusing to comply with the Order
and the Regulations (and in particular . . . from failing to make
compensatory payments, i.e., back pay, to female and minority group
employees who had been discriminated against in the past . . . ); and (2)
cancelling all of [the bank's] government contracts." 5 The bank responded
by questioning the constitutionality of the prayer for back pay, but the
administrative law judge refused to consider the issue on "the ground that
he did not have the power to decide statutory and constitutional issues.""
The bank, in an effort to obtain a resolution of the back pay issue, filed in
federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief restraining OFCCP from
enforcing its back pay regulations. The district court refused to rule on the
constitutional challenge to the administrative regulations, however,
because, in its view, the issue was "not yet ripe for review.,
47
Thus, the court failed to find a justiciable issue in the only case in
which back pay relief under the Order has come under attack, and the
constitutionality of the regulations remains an open issue in the courts.
Because the Civil Rights Act of 196448 contains analogous provisions,
however, some guidance can be gleaned from back pay cases decided under
that statute.
1. Due Process Under Title VII
Section 2000-(f)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which grants to the
circumstances, that "you are guilty until proven innocent-and you have no appeal."
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Dominick amendment which
removes this regulatory power from the bureaucracy and puts it where it should be, with the
court.
44. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 558 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Two other cases have dealt with the right of
OFCCP to seek back pay for individuals in court. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 20
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1345 (10th Cir. 1979) (reversing and remanding without expressing an opinion
on the district court's original ruling that the government-in this case both the Department of Justice
and EEOC-lacked the power to bring a back pay action on behalf of individual employees); United
States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that the Department of
Justice has power to bring an action in federal court for back pay under Exec. Order No. 11246).
45. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 559-60.
46. Id. at 560.
47. Id. Although OFCCP had sought enforcement of its back pay regulations in the
administrative complaint, the ALJ had not issued a decision awarding back pay. The court, therefore,
ruled that the issue was "not appropriate for judicial resolution." Id. at 561. The Seventh Circuit re-
fused to reach the merits of a contractor's challenge to the OFCCP's discovery regulations. Uniroyal
Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978). Whether the conclusion reached by these courts was
correct is beyond the scope of this Article.
48. Pub. L. No. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241 (1964). The substantive provisions ofthe Act, as amended by
later legislation, are codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). All further
references to the Act will be to the codified provisions.
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federal district courts jurisdiction of actions brought under Title VII,49
guides the courts in fashioning remedies for employment discrimination
through the following language:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay, ... or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay award otherwise allowable. No order of the
court shall require ... the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused ...employment or advancement or was suspended
or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.5
In exercising their discretion under this section, the courts have made
it clear that a back pay award5 will not be forthcoming automatically;
rather, the complaining employee must affirmatively establish that such an
award is appropriate. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,52 the
Supreme Court set forth the proper nature and order of proof that must be
established by a Title VII plaintiff, holding that although the complainant
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment
discrimination violative of the Act, 3 once this prima facie case is proven,
the burden "must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) provides as follows:
(3) Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in
which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or
in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged
unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district,
such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his
principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in
which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which
the action might have been brought.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) ( emphasis added).
51. The back pay provisions of Title VII litigation were not new to employment cases. In fact, the
provisions were "modeled on the back pay provision of the National Labor Relations Act." Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
52. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Although the Albemarle Court weakened this statement by stating that
"given a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied for reasons which . ..would
not frustrate the central statutory purposes. . . ." 442 U.S. at 421, subsequent decisions have es-
tablished that an employee must establish his or her entitlement to back pay.
53. 411 U.S. at 802. According to the Court, the burden is satisfied if the employee shows
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
rd. (footnotes omitted).
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nondiscriminatory reason" for its discriminatory treatment of the
complainant." In rebuttal, the complainant must then be given an
opportunity to show that "the presumptively valid reasons" advanced by
the employer may have been "in fact a coverup for a . ..discriminatory
",15decision. ' s
Once a finding of discrimination is made, the role of the judiciary
becomes crucial since the courts are then charged with exercising their
"equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible," to effect
the purposes of the Act 6  For example, in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co.,57 which concerned a request for an adjustment of the
seniority status for individuals who had proved a discriminatory hiring
pattern by the employer, the Supreme Court emphasized the discretionary
role of the courts when they analyzed the "make whole" purpose of Title
VIIL 8 While holding that the judicial denial of seniority relief in such an
instance was permissible "only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes '59 of the Act, the Court
warned: "We are not to be understood as holding that an award of
seniority status is requisite in all circumstances. The fashioning of
appropriate remedies invokes the sound equitable discretion of the district
court., 60 Concluding that class-based seniority adjustment was a proper
form of relief under Title VII, the Court reaffirmed the fact that there may
be cases under Title VII that call for "one remedy but not the other," and
that "these choices are of course left in the first instance to the district
courts."
,61
These principles were refined by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,62 a case in which a pattern of
54. Id. at 802. In McDonnell the complainant's participation in the unlawful conduct against
the employer was sufficient evidence "to meet the prima facie case . . ." Id. at 804.
55. Id. at 805. The same requirements attach to class actions, whether brought by individuals or
by the EEOC. The requirements for class actions are particularly significant, for both Exec. Order
11246 and the regulations are designed to provide relief for "affected" classes. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-
1.33 (1979).
56. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976).
57. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
58. The Court then noted that since the individuals had "carried their burden of demonstrating
the existence" of the discriminatory practice, the burden would then be upon the employer to prove
that the individuals were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination. Id. at 772. "Only if this
burden is met may retroactive seniority-if otherwise determined to be an appropriate form of relief
under the circumstances of the particular case-be denied individual class member." Id. at 773. It must
be noted that the Court not only outlined the type of evidence that could be adduced by the employer in
rebuttal, but noted that the victim, rather than the perpetrator of the alleged act, should bear the
burden of proving what his job performance would have been but for the discrimination. Id. at 773,
n.32.
59. Id. at 771, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
60. Id. at 770.
61. Id. at 779, citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975). See also
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 443 U.S. 299 (1977) (discussing the proper order of proof in
Title VII cases).
62. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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discrimination against minorities had been established 63 and in which the
only question was whether retroactive seniority was an appropriate
remedy for pre-Act discrimination.64 After reviewing the legislative history
of the Act,65 the Court concluded that such relief was not available when
there was a "bona fide" seniority system in effect prior to the Act, even
though the seniority system may have caused discrimination. In detailing
the basis for relief on remand to the district court, the Supreme Court
discussed "questions relating to the appropriate measure of individual
relief" in "pattern or practice" actions.66 Relying on its earlier deci-
sion in McDonnell Douglas, the Court reasserted that "an individual
Title VII complainant must carry the initial burden of proof by
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 67 Noting the
differences between the "liability" and the "remedial" stages of a pattern or
practice suit,68 the Court emphatically pointed out that "the question of
individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer
has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination., 69 The
Court elaborated further:
At the initial, "liability" stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the Government is
not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately
seek relief was a victim of the employer's discriminatory policy. Its burden is
to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then
shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or
practice by demonstrating that the Government's proof is either inaccurate or
insignificant.
According to the Court, if the employer fails to rebut the government's
prima facie case, the court can conclude that a violation has occurred and
can then proceed to determine the appropriate relieL7' The Court
specifically noted that "[w]ithout any further evidence from the
Government, a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies an award of
prospective relief.,72 Significantly, the Court also noted that proof in the
63. The Court noted that the EEOC had carried its burden of proof and that the employer had
failed to rebut it. Id. at 337-40.
64. The Court reasserted that its earlier decision in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), had established the availability of retroactive relief for post-Act discrimination. 431 U.S. at 346.
65. In particular the Court was concerned with § 703(h) of Title VII,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976),
which provides in part as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority ... system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result ofan intention
to discriminate because of race ... or national origin. ...
66. 431 U.S. at 357.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 360-62.
69. Id. at 361.
70. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 361.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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liability stage was not sufficient to establish individual relief: "When the
Government seeks individual relief for victims of the discriminatory
practice, a district court must usually conduct additionalproceedings after
the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief.,
73
The ultimate task in pattern or practice cases will be to strike a balance
"between the statutory rights of victims and the contractual rights of
nonvictim employees. That determination is best left, in the first instance,
to the sound equitable discretion of the trial court.,
74
The use of Title VII precedent to analyze issues raised under
Executive Order 11246 finds support in the recent decision of United States
v. Trucking Management, Inc. 75 In Trucking Management, the district
court flatly rejected the contention that the seniority system declared
lawful and bona fide by the Teamsters Court under Title VII was unlawful
under Executive Order 11246. The government, as plaintiff,76 advanced the
theory that "the obligations on government contractors under the
Executive Order are above and beyond those imposed on employers by
Title VII because the Executive Order contains no provision [that
immunizes bona fide seniority plans] . . . .,7 In rejecting the govern-
ment's theory, the court stated: "It is not for this court to run afoul of the
statutory construction of Title VII or the will of Congress. And nothing in
Executive Order 11246, its accompanying regulations and history, or other
legal precedents supports such a course., 78 The Trucking Management
court reviewed the history and purposes of the Order, emphasizing the
need to enforce the Order "within the framework of Congress' legislative
will." 79 It further stated that the executive branch cannot exercise its deriv-
ative authority "in a manner inconsistent with the implied or expressed will
of Congress,"8 ° and held that an adoption of the government's contention
and interpretation of the Order "would run afoul of the statutory
construction of Title VII and legislative intent of Congress as pronounced
73. Id. (emphasis added). According to the Court, an individual may show that he is entitled to
the relief, by, inter alia, proving that he possessed the requisite qualifications and that he applied for a
particular job. However, the burden of proof at this stage is on the employer. Id. at 362.
74. Id. at 376 (footnotes omitted).
75. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 342 (D.D.C. 1979), appeal docketed, C.A. No. 74-453 (D.C. Cir
Sept. 18, 1979).
76. The Action was brought by the United States and the EEOC against several unions and
trucking companies.
77. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 346. The court noted that a similar argument had been made in
EEOC v. East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc., 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). The reply in East Texas
was clearly contrary to the government's position:
This is an argument never made until after the Teamsters decision.
The argument cannot be accepted because Congress has declared for a policy that a bona
fide seniority system shall be lawful. The Executive may not, in defense of such policy, make
unlawful-or penalize-a bona fide seniority system.
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
78. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 347.
79. Id. at 348.
80. Id.
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by the Supreme Court, and as such would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers and vitiate the holding of Teamsters."'81
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Marshall,82 one of the latest in a series of
cases83 striking down OFCCP's "passover" procedures,84 the Seventh
Circuit appeared to apply due process considerations to certain OFCCP
regulations by holding that the passover regulations were "invalid because
they permitted debarment without a hearing and therefore were
inconsistent with section 208(b) of the Order."85 The court, however, failed
to find the same infirmity with the regulation that provides that a
contractor is not in noncompliance as long as he has an "affected class"
86
because, in its view, a hearing on the merits is necessary to determine
whether a contractor actually has an affected class problem.87 On the other
hand, under the passover regulation a contractor could be debarred
without a hearing merely because OFCCP had made a prima facie
determination of noncompliance.88 The court differentiated the passover
regulation from the "show cause" regulation because the latter, without
more, did not debar contractors from receiving government contracts.
89
Significantly, the district court had upheld the government's right to
publish and disseminate a list of contractors alleged to be in non-
compliance, a different list from the "nonawardable" list it had struck
down.90 The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that this listing, like a listing
of "nonawardable contractors," could "be a sanction tantamount to
debarment" and was allowable "only after hearing on the merits."9' The
81. Id. at 348-49.
82. 601 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1979).
83. See comments by Elisburg at Conference, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (No. 216) A-4 (Nov. 6,
1979).
84. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(b) (1979). The regulation has been amended to reflect the nearly
unanimous court decisions striking down the regulation.
85. 601 F.2d at 947. Section 208(b) provides:
The Secretary of Labor may hold, or cause to be held, hearings in accordance with Subsection
(a) of this Section prior to imposing, ordering, or recommending the imposition of penalties
and sanctions under this Order. No order for debarment of any contractor from further
Government contracts under Section 209(a)(6) shall be made without affording the
contractor an opportunity for a hearing.
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2304.
86. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1(b) (1979) provides:
Relief, including back pay where appropriate, for members of an affected class who by virtue
of past discrimination continue to suffer the present effects of that discrimination, shall be
provided in the conciliation agreement entered into pursuant to § 60-60.6 of this title. An
"affected class" problem must be remedied in order for a contractor to be considered in
compliance. Section 60-2.2 herein pertaining to an acceptable affirmative action program is
also applicable to the failure to remedy discrimination against members of an "affected class."
87. 601 F.2d at 948.
88. The court reached this conclusion because of the action of the government in publishing
Illinois Tool Works' name in a public list of"nonawardable" contractors. The publication effectively
prevented Illinois Tool Works from being awarded a previously negotiated Navy contract. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 949.
[Vol. 41:401
1980] BACK PAY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 415
court held that section 208, which provides for hearings prior to
enforcement, 92 and section 209, which lists sanctions and penalties,
93
"should be construed together., 94
2. The Implementation of the Back Pay Regulations
OFCCP recently published its Contractor Compliance Manual,
95
which, according to the introductory section, contains "the policies and
procedures for enforcing the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the
Order." Although not published pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act,96 the Manual, which is the primary source of OFCCP
policies and procedures, includes an entire chapter outlining the process by
which retrospective relief may be determined by an equal opportunity
specialist (EOS).
Chapter 7 of the Manual, entitled "Identification and Resolution of
Affected Class Problems under Executive Order 11246," states that the
Manual's purpose is "to provide the EOS with a suggested analytical
framework for identifying and substantiating systemic discrimination, and
suggested methods for identifying affected class[es] and fashioning
remedies. 97 A salient feature of this chapter is its emphasis upon both
statistical analyses and salary comparisons. According to the Manual,
statistical analysis is the primary, though not exclusive, tool for identifying
systemic discrimination.98 Salary comparisons, another tool for iden-
tifying affected classes, is best exemplified by what OFCCP has termed
"cohort analysis." 99 The basic procedure of cohort analysis is to examine
the contractor's treatment of employees with similar characteristics, such
as education, experience, and similar initial hire dates, and then to
compare the employees' current salaries. When the comparison shows that
92. Section 208(a) provides as follows:
The Secretary of Labor, or any agency, officer, or employee in the executive branch of the
Government designated by rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary, may hold such
hearings, public or private, as the Secretary may deem advisable for compliance,
enforcement, or educational purposes.
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) LRX 2304. For the text of § 208(b), see note 85 supra.
93. See note 24 supra.
94. 601 F.2d at 949.
95. OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE MAN-
UAL [hereinafter cited as Manual].
96. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Because it was not published in accordancewith
the Administrative Procedure Act, the Manual is not entitled to the deference given regulations. See
text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. See also In the matter of OFCCP v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.. Daily LAB. REP. (BNA) (No. 109) D-I (June 4, 1980) (recommended decision of ALJ), rev'd,
Decision and Final order of the Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor OFCCP v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (No. 137) E-I (July 15, 1980). The ALJ held that Technical
Guidance Memo No. l, a policy directive issued by OFCCP in February, 1974, is a substantive rule but
"does not have the force and effect of low nor the authority of a duly promulgated administrative
regulation" because it was not published in accordance with the APA. This holding was specifically
recycled by the Secretary of Labor in his decision and final order.
97. Manual § 7-10.
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 7-40.4(d).
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white males are generally in higher paying classifications than females and
minorities, a presumption of discrimination arises.'00
Other analyses that are provided as alternatives to the "cohort
analysis" likewise will lead to the identification of problem areas, mostly
identifiable in terms of salary differentials. For example, one section
entitled "Salary distribution" compares "the number and percentage of
minorities and women in each salary group to concentrations and relative
position within the workforce."'' 1 Regardless of the method used, if any
one or more of these analyses shows problems, "then there is a strong
indication of systemic discrimination."'
0 2
If the initial comparisons suggest systemic discrimination, the
Manual instructs the EOS to test the hypothesis by using the following
procedures:
(1) Determining whether there has been a loss of income;
(2) Comparing average or median wage or salary for minorities and
women in areas of concentration with the average and median
wage or salary for non-minorities and/ or men in areas of under-
representation;
(3) Determining earnings potential in areas of high concentration;
(4) Determining whether areas of concentration afford less desirable
work schedules; and
(5) Comparing work schedules to determine whether high concen-
tration areas have less job security and poorer working
conditions.)13
If there are reasons to presume the existence of systemic discrimination,
the EOS must examine "possible explanations for the evidence of
discrimination." The EOS then must give the contractor an opportunity to
"rebut, explain, or justify apparent discrimination" and, in analyzing these
explanations, must take the possible effects of present and past
discrimination into account.10 4 Moreover, the Manual provides that the
EOS must eliminate seniority or job related qualifications as explanations
for concentrations,10 5 and instructs the EOS to verify his or her
100. For example, § 7-40.5(b) of the Manual states:
"If a cohort analysis or a frequency distribution shows a severe concentration of women at the
lower end of the salary scale, whereas men are distributed throughout, then the EOS might
hypothesize that there are assignment, promotion, and/or training problems."
101. Manual § 7-40.4(e)(1).
102. Manual § 7-40.5(c). Interestingly, this section uses language indicating the creation of a
presumption rather than a conclusion.
103. Manual § 7.40-6. The term "underrepresentation" is a term of art used throughout the
Manual and the OFCCP regulations. It is defined in the Manual's glossary of terms at § 1-60.103 as
follows:
Underutilization. Employment of members of a race, ethnic, or sex group in a job or job
group at a rate below their availability. The concept of underutilization includes any
numerical disparity, and is not limited by the 80% rule applicable to concepts such as adverse
impact. Underutilization for contractors subject to 41 CFR Part 60-2 is determined by
conducting a job group analysis according to 41 CFR 60-2.1 l(b).
104. Manual § 7.40-6.
105. Id. at § 7-40.7. OFCCP challenges of past discrimination remain vigorous notwithstanding
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"conclusion of systemic discrimination and the existence of an affected
class" through record sampling °6
After sufficient documentation has been obtained, the Manual
provides that the EOS "should formulate conclusions about the nature of
the systemic discrimination that appears to have created an affected
class.' 0 7 Thereafter, the EOS should identify the membership in the
affected class, considering incumbent employees, applicants, former
employees and retired employees. 08
The Manual then instructs the EOS to formulate affected class
remedies and provide guidance and examples. The parameters of the
remedy are to be measured by "the extent to which affected class members
have fallen behind non-class employees and are suffering economic or
other loss. ' 09 The amount of economic loss is estimated by "determining
the loss suffered by that portion of the affected class which, but for the
discrimination and/or failure to remedy the effects of past discrimination,
should have been afforded opportunities offering greater economic
advantage.""lo
The Manual contains the following instructions concerning back pay
computation:
Back pay computation. Computing the back pay due affected class members
can be complicated. However, two broad principles always apply. Unrealistic
exactitude is not required, and uncertainties in determining what would have
been earned but for discrimination must be resolved in favor of the victim.
The key is to avoid unfairly excluding discriminatees by defining the class or
the determinants of the award too narrowly.
The method of computation will depend on the complexity of the case. If
the class is small and the discrimination is clear, fairly precise determinations
are normally possible by hypothtically reconstructing each discriminatee's
work history. However, where the class size, ambiguity of promotion or
hiring practices, multiple effects of discriminatory practices, or length of time
over which the determination occurred creates a multitude of hypothetical
judgments, a classwide approach to the computation of back pay may be
appropriate.
All back pay awards are based on estimates of the difference between the
income affected class members would have received during the back pay
period, if there had not been discrimination, and/or its continuing effects,
and the income they actually received.'
There are a number of methods provided for computing back pay
liability. One method is an averaging formula, which requires the EOS to
Teamsters, see text accompanying notes 62-74 supra, and Trucking Management, see text
accompanying notes 75-81 supra. OFCCP maintains that Teamsters does not apply to it and has taken
an appeal from Trucking Management, see 44 Fed. Reg. 77,000-01 (1979).
106. Manual § 7-40.8.
107. Id. at § 7-40.9.
108. Id. at § 7-40.10.
109. Id. at § 7-50.
110. Id. at § 7-50.2.
Ill. Id. at § 7-130.2.
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determine the difference between the average rate of pay received by those
employees in the group from which the affected class was excluded and the
average rate received by each member of the affected class during the
relevant period' 12 A second method is the representative employee
earnings formula, which is described in the Manual as follows:
Approximations are based on a group of employees who were not injured by
the pattern and practice of discrimination, and who are comparable in ability,
seniority, and numbers. Affected class members are awarded the difference
between the earnings of such comparable employees during the pay period
and their own earnings.'
3
A final method is the pro rata share formula, which is based upon a
computation of the contractor's total liability-the average economic loss
times the number of additional vacancies that affected class members
would have filled but for the discrimination-pro-rated over the entire
class.'
1 4
After computing back pay liability, the EOS must proceed to
conciliation." 5 In attempting to negotiate a conciliation agreement,' 16 the
Manual requires that the EOS "endeavor to have the contractor admit the
violation(s) set forth in .. . the conciliation."'" 7 As stated earlier, failure
to resolve the deficiencies will lead OFCCP to recommend enforcement
proceedings." 8
3. Applicability of the Title VII Principles
to the Implementation of the Back Pay
Regulations
In order to determine whether a contractor is in compliance with
112. Id. at § 7-103.2(c)(1).
113. Id. at § 7-130.2(c)(2).
114. Id. at § 7-130.2(c)(3).
115. Both Exec. Order No. 11246 and the regulations require an attempt at conciliation. See text
accompanying note 10 supra.
116. Section 8-110.1(a) of the Manual points out that an agreement is necessary.
117. Manual § 8.130.2(c).
118. Manual § 8-170.1(a). 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (1979), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 927Z
(January 1, 1980), provides that OFCCP's director, or his designee, may refer the matter to the
Solicitor of labor for the institution of appropriate enforcement proceedings to enjoin the violations, to
seek appropriate relief (including back pay), or to impose sanctions.
The regulations also provide an alternate route to enforcement proceedings. Under this method
the contractor must comply with the recommendations of the Director. Then request a hearing and
review of the action alleged to be erroneous. The hearing must be requested within 10 days of
"compliance." 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.24(c)(4) (1979). According to the Manual in the case ofcomplianceby
executing a conciliation agreement, this 10 day time period begins upon the contractor's receipt of the
signed copy from the OFCCP Officer approving the agreement. Manual § 8-130.6(g)(1). Neither the
Manual nor the regulations address themselves to the question of whether the request for a hearing
nullifies, or at least delays, the effectiveness of the agreement, although this is presumably the result.
Query, whether such a procedure, even though staying the terms of the agreement, would
nevertheless expose the contractor to a deluge of individual Title VII claims by the alleged members of
the affected class based upon the deficiencies asserted by OFCCP. For this reason alone, the writers
doubt the practicality of the alternative. Interestingly, OFCCP's recently published proposed
regulations indicate that this alternative may be eliminated in the future, or if retained, will involve a
record hearing before an OFCCP official, rather than a hearing before an ALJ with live testimony. 44
Fed. Reg. at 77,007 (1979).
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Executive Order 11246, OFCCP necessarily must review a contractor's
adherence to the equal employment opportunity and affirmative action
requirements of the Order. 119 In conducting this review, the OFCCP, as an
investigatory and enforcement agency, arguably is empowered to gather
data that could present a prima facie case of unlawful discriminatory
practices. Establishing a prima facie case in this manner is consistent with
McDonnell Douglas, Franks, and Teamsters, since in order to impose
sanctions under section 209 of the Order, such violations must be
established at an adjudicatory proceeding.
According to the Teamsters Court, however, proof of a prima facie
case is only the first step in the "liability" stage of a pattern or practice
suit. 120 The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and ultimately the court is faced
with the difficult task of striking a balance of the equities.12' By instructing
the EOS to permit rebuttal by the contractor, the Manual gives the em-
ployer an opportunity to explain its actions. 122 It can be argued, however,
that the EOS is not an impartial judge since the Manual also reminds the
EOS that the possible effects of both present and past discrimination must
be taken into account and that seniority and job qualifications must be
eliminated as explanations.
This lack of impartiality inherent in the Manual makes it apparent
that a prima facie case will rarely, if ever, be effectively rebutted,
particularly when the explanations hinge on a bona fide seniority system,
legitimate job qualifications, or both. Moreover, it is absurd to think that
the EOS could, or indeed should, act as an impartial trier of fact in
assessing the rebuttal evidence presented by the contractor, given the fact
that, in practice, an adversarial relationship develops between the EOS
and the contractor, and, more importantly, that it was the EOS who
concluded that the contractor had discriminated in the first instance. It is
evident that in enacting Title VII and, indeed, other employment related
legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act, Congress was aware
that the role of assessing a contractor's rebuttal evidence belongs to the
judiciary or, at the very least, to an impartial quasi-judicial body such as
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Nothing in Executive Order
11246 permits less in cases of alleged violations of the Order. Nonetheless,
because the EOS becomes the judge, the "liability" stage is effectively
concluded once a prima facie case is established, notwithstanding the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Franks and McDonnell
Douglas. Thus, the Manual fails to observe the difference between the
liability stage and the remedial stages of a discrimination case.
119. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra. If an affirmative action program is required, a com-
pliance review should, and under the regulation does, include review of the employer's affirmative
action program as well. See 41 CFR § 60-1.20(a) & 60-1.40(c), (1979).
120. See text accompanying notes 62-74 supra.
121. Id.
122. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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Even assuming arguendo that the prima facie case established by the
EOS cannot be rebutted, the Teamsters Court emphatically noted that,
without more evidence, only a prospective remedy can follow from such
proof. Nevertheless, in practice the OFCCP totally ignores the liability
stage, since the EOS not only fails to conduct additional proceedings to
determine the scope of individual relief in accordance with Teamsters, but,
in effect, fashions a retroactive remedy from evidence that could justify at
most only a prospective remedy. 123 Neither the Order nor the con-
gressional delegation of power authorizes this abrogation of the role of the
judiciary in fashioning remedies that, by their very nature, must be left to
the sound equitable discretion of the courts.1
24
The implementation of the back pay regulations also raises another
problem. The regulations describe an affirmative action program as a "set
of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits
himself to apply every goodfaith effort."' 25 In this vein, the Ninth Circuit,
in Legal Aid Society v. Brennan,126 stated: "[T]he goals [of an affirmative
action program] remain only 'targets reasonably attainable by means of
applying every good faith effort' by the contractor. . . . Compliance is
measured by good faith efforts to attain them, not by whether they are
realized."' 27 The back pay policy as implemented by OFCCP does not
recognize the existence of this standard. The only reference to "good faith"
in chapter 7(3) of the Manual is in a paragraph dealing with "good cause"
as a possible explanation for a presumptive discriminatory practice.123
This leads to the inescapable conclusion that "good faith efforts" plainly
will not be sufficient to avoid the imposition of back pay. The McDonnell
Douglas requirement that the employer be given the right to "articulate
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason' 29 is eliminated. While good
faith efforts arguably would not be sufficient to rebut evidence of
discrimination, a court of law, in the exercise of its equitable powers, could
take into consideration such efforts in mitigating back pay liability. The
abrogation by OFCCP ofjudicial powers, however, leaves no room for the
exercise of the equitable discretion that is vested in the courts.
Even if the regulations had the appropriate nexus to a legislative grant
123. A compliance review not only involves a"desk audit" of the contractor's affirmative action
program, but also an "on-site" review. Often during the on-site review additional data is gathered for
off-site analysis. It is only after the analysis, including back pay computations, see text accompanying
notes 111-14, supra, is completed that an "exit" conference with the contractor is held and OFCCP's
final conclusions are communicated to the contractor. See Manual § 3-180.
124. See Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1978), in which the
court remanded a case to the district court for individual hearings on remedies.
125. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1979) (emphasis added).
126. 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. deniedsub. noma. Chamber of Commerce v. Legal Aid
Society, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,977 (1980).
127. Id. at 1342.
128. " 'Good cause' is different from 'good faith efforts.' 'Good faith efforts' may excuse a
contractor from failing to meet a goal or save it from sanctions, but would not necessarily exonerate it
from the requirements of the law involved." Manual § 8-30.6(b).
129. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[Vol. 41:401
1980] BACK PAY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 421
of authority, it is nevertheless apparent that the collection of back pay in
extra-judicial 130 proceedings violates every tenet of constitutional due
process principles. The abrogation of judicial power by the Executive is
not contemplated by the Order and constitutes an impermissible exercise
of regulatory power. It must be noted that, unlike NLRB cases, in which
the NLRB must resort to the courts for enforcement of its orders,1
31
OFCCP determinations are self-executing. Indeed, other sanctions, in-
cluding debarment, may well be instituted for failure to comply with
OFCCP's back pay demands even during the pendency of administrative
proceedings before an administrative law judge. Similarly, unlike NLRB
back pay proceedings, which are the subject of published rules that require
the issuance of detailed, complete specifications, 3 2 the amounts allegedly
due under OFCCP proceedings are subject to "secret" formulations and
are not ultimately determined pursuant to a hearing before an impartial
third party. The fears that Senator Brock expressed during the
Congressional debates in 1972 have indeed materialized in the name of
OFCCP, which has turned its agents into "policemen, judge, jury, and
prosecutor, all rolled into one."'
' 33
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
As was stated earlier, to have the "force and effect of law," an
administrative rule must not only have certain substantive characteristics,
it must also meet specific procedural requirements. 3 4 Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes the procedures that must
be met in promulgating a rule. 35 In section II, this Article examined the
130. See note 9 supra. As stated above, "extra-judicial," as used herein, includes administrative
proceedings in which OFCCP acts as the prosecuting agency. See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.25 (1979) which
provides an alternative to referral to the Solicitor under 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (1979) by permitting
the Director to assume jurisdiction.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 102.53 (1979).
133. See note 43 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) provides:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that
there is involved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description ofthesubjects
and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon
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substantive characteristics of the back pay regulations. 3 6 This section will
examine the regulations in light of the procedural requirements imposed
by the APA.
Section 553 establishes the public notice and comment procedures
that must be followed before a valid rule can issue. 137 Under the APA,
general notice of proposed rulemaking must be published in the Federal
Register at least thirty days before the effective date of the proposed rule.138
Additionally, interested persons must be afforded an opportunity to
submit written data, views, or arguments concerning the rule. 39 The
purpose of these procedures was explained in Guardian Federal Savings &
Loan v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation:4
This public participation assures that the agency will have before it the facts
and information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as
suggestions for alternative solutions. Public rulemaking procedures increase
the likelihood of administrative responsiveness to the needs and concerns of
those affected. And the procedure for public participation tends to promote
acquiescence in the result even when objections remain as to substance.' 4'
As the court in Guardian Federal noted, Congress has excepted a
number of administrative actions from these procedural requirements.
These exceptions exist to "accommodate situations where the policies
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than
30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and p7blished with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) states:
(4) "rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the
foregoing. ...
136. See text accompanying notes 19-133 supra.
137. See § 553(b) and (c), supra note 132. While § 553 ordinarily would not apply to matters
relating to contracts, in order to carry out Recommendation No. 16 of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, the Secretary of Labor waived that exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1971).
138. See § 553(d), supra note 132.
139. These procedures constitute the maximum procedural requirements that courts can impose
on federal agencies in conducting rule making procedures, although agencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights at their own discretion. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
140. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. Id. at 662.
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promoted by public participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the
countervailing considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, expedition and
reduction in expense."'' 42  Section 553(b)(3)(A) currently provides
exceptions for (1) interpretative rules, (2) general statements of policy, and
(3) rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.143
When OFCCP added the phrase "including back pay where
appropriate" to its regulations in 1977, it stated that the change merely
"codified OFCCP policies regarding back pay and affected class relief
which had been in effect for several years."' 44 Indeed, in 1979 OFCCP
stated that back pay relief had been available under Executive Order 11246
since at least 1967.14' Thus, in failing to publish earlier the back pay relief
policy or the rules pertaining to its implementation, OFCCP must, to
sustain their validity, rely on one of the three exceptions provided by
section 553(b)(3)(A).
Since OFCCP has not stated that its back pay policy constitutes a
rule, the threshold question is whether the policy is itself a "rule" that
would have been subject to the APA procedural requirements at the time
of its initial implementation. A subsequent question is whether, regardless
of how the practice is characterized, it was made explicit in those
regulations that dealt with the provisions to which it would apply.1
46
A. Whether the Regulations are Within the Purview
of the APA Exceptions
Before the propriety of OFCCP's action with respect to back pay
policy and regulations is examined, it is appropriate to provide, as a
backdrop to the issue, an overview of the pertinent exceptions from the
APA requirements. A universally accepted principle that has guided
reviewing courts is that an agency's own characterization of its action is not
binding upon the court-thus, if agency action in fact constitutes a rule,
compliance with the APA provisions will be required. In Columbia
142. Id.
143. See § 553(b)(3)(A), supra note 135.
144. 42 Fed. Reg. 3456 (1977).
145. 44 Fed. Reg. 77,000 (1979).
146. The thrust of this inquiry is not predicated on the idea that established rules or policies were
to be re-submitted through rule making procedures once the waiver became effective, since the court in
Crown Zellerback Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (E.D. La. 1977), has expressly held that
such is not required inasmuch as there was no indication that the waiver was to be applied retroactively.
It is assumed, however, that to the extent that the policy would be implemented through regulations
proposed subsequent to the effective date of the waiver, its existence should have been included therein.
Indeed, publication of the policy may well have been required under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).
The policy on back pay, later included in Revised Order No. 4,41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (1979), was not
set forth when Part 60-2 of the Regulations (Revised Order No. 4) was added on December 4, 1971,
even though OFCCP contends thatit has been in existence since 1967. Except for a 1974 amendment,
which made back pay relief express, and which provided that affected class relief was to be included in a
conciliation agreement rather than in the contractor's affirmative action program or a separate written
corrective action program, this section has been unchanged since 1971. Thus, on at least these two
occasions, even if the "policy" had not been properly the subject of a "rule", OFCCP could have
apprised the public of its existence, but failed to do so.
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Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,147 the Court stated: "The
particular label placed upon it by the [Federal Communications]
Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for it is the substance of what the
Commission has purported to do and has done which is decisive."
t 48
1. The Interpretative Rule Exception
One of the exceptions to the APA public notice and comment
procedures is the "interpretative rule."'149 According to Gibson Wine Co. v.
Snyder: t
50
Thae distinctive characteristics of interpretative rulings, as contrasted with so-
called regulations, have long been recognized. Administrative officials
frequently announce their views as to the meaning of statutes or regulations.
Generally speaking, it seems to be established that "regulations", "substantive
rules" or "legislative rules" are those which create law, usually implementary
to an existing law; whereas interpretative rules are statements as to what the
administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means.
15
'
An examination of those decisions that distinguish between
substantive rules and interpretative rules reveals that the determinative
factors are (1) whether the rule is intended to have the full force and effect
of law, and (2) whether a significant change, not authorized under existing
12
regulations, is made with respect to the obligations of affected persons.
These factors were held to be critical in Reyes v. Klein,'5 in which an
action was brought against certain state officials for declaratory and
injunctive relief based on their alleged failure to enforce and comply with
requirements promulgated pursuant to the Federal Food Stamp
Program-specifically, the requirement that the variable purchase option
be included on the face of the "authorization to purchase" card. In
147. 316 U.S. 407 (1941). Although this case arose prior to the enactment of the APA and the
issues before the Court were whether the regulations constituted a reviewable order under § 402(a) of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and, if so, whether an equitable cause of action had been
stated, it is unquestioned that the analysis is helpful in making distinctions between a rule and a general
statement of policy under the APA. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33,42 n.25 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
148. 316 U.S. at 416.
149. While, for analytical purposes, the authors discuss the exceptions as if they are discrete and
not overlapping, the difficulty in making such distinctions is well recognized. See K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.5, at 25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
150. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
151. Id. at 331.
152. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the effect of EEOC interpretative
rules concerning sickness and accident benefits for disability due to pregnancy was examined. The
Court held that EEOC's "rulings, interpretations, and opinions", while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, constituted "a body of experience and informedjudgment to whichcourts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at 141-42. The weight to be accorded them,
according to the Court, would "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. The EEOC guideline was found lacking in
persuasive value because it was not a contemporaneous interpretation, it contradicted the agency's
earlier position and was not supported by legislative history.
153. 411 F. Supp. 1241 (D.N.J. 1976).
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response to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, the
defendants asserted that because the regulations had not been validly
promulgated, they could not have the effect of law. Observing that the
instruction could have been excepted from the APA requirements as an
"interpretative rule," the court ultimately rejected that characterization
and held the instruction to be invalid and unenforceable because (1) it set
forth a requirement not contained in prior regulations, (2) it was
mandatory, and (3) it was intended to have the force of law. 154
Continental Oil Co. v. Burns155 sets forth a good discussion of the
distinction between interpretative and substantive rules. In that case, an
action was brought against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for declaratory and
injunctive relief in connection with an interpretation of the Truth in
Lending Act which had been issued by the Board of Governors. The
interpretation, which had been published in the Federal Register on May
10, 1969, without compliance with the APA procedures, set forth three
criteria for determining when a "late payment" charge must be considered
a "finance" charge. Continental Oil contended that because of the
unexpected adoption of the rule, it was threatened with both an FTC
enforcement action and the possibility of extensive civil liability as a result
of numerous class actions that had been filed by its customers. The
government contended that the interpretation was an "interpretative rule"
and that compliance with the APA requirements thus was not necessary.
The court stated:
An administrative interpretation or interpretative rule is a clarification or
explanation of existing laws or regulations rather than a substantive
modification in or adoption of new regulations. Substantive legislative rules
and regulations "create law-whereas interpretative rules are statements as to
what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means."'
56
The court concluded that the FTC interpretation at issue was, in fact,
an interpretative rule and as such was not subject to the APA notice and
comment provisions. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered
three determinative factors. First, the court noted that the interpretation
was not a complex and pervasive regulatory scheme, but instead merely
represented an attempt to clarify or define the meaning of "actual
unanticipated late payment" charge.157 Second, the court concluded that
the interpretation effected no drastic change in the existing law, since the
explanation of the section preceded the effective date of the Truth in
Lending Act and the regulation. Accordingly, there was no retroactive
effect to the interpretation. 158 Finally, the court held that the three criteria
154. Id. at 1246.
155. 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970).
156. Id. at 197. (Citations omitted).
157. Id. at 198.
158. Id.
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set forth in the interpretation were not confusing or controversial and that
compliance would be no more onerous to this plaintiff than to others
subject to its requirements. 59
Further insight into the "interpretative rule" exemption may be
gleaned from examination of cases in which the exemption was rejected. In
Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corporation,6 ° the court held that a regulation that required
audits to be conducted exclusively by non-agency accountants was not an
interpretative rule because it purported to change the course of agency
policy.'
6
'
In Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,162 it was held that the
parole selection criteria promulgated by the parole board did not
constitute interpretative rules inasmuch as they were self-imposed controls
over the manner and circumstances in which the agency would exercise its
statutorily broad power and substantially affected persons' rights. 63 In
Aiken v. Obledo,164 which concerned a regulation that placed restrictions
on the certification of households for food stamp benefits pending
verification, and in Spring Mills, Inc. v. Consumer Products Safety
Commission,165 which concerned regulations that banned a certain flame
retardant, the courts held that the agency rules did not constitute
interpretative rules because they had the effect of law with far-reaching
consequences. 166
159. Id. Continental Oil argued that because a proposed amendment to Regulation Z
embodying the content of Interpretation § 226.401 issued by the Board for comment on April 13, 1970,
had never been adopted, the interpretation actually constituted a substantive rule and not merely an
interpretation. The court observed that since the proposed amendment set forth only one criterion for
including late payment charges and the calculation of finance charges; it would have the effect of
narrowing the existing exception, and thus, the fact that the Board followed the notice and comment
procedures was not relevant. Id. at 198-9. Continental also attempted to rely on a letter from the
Acting Chief of the Division of Consumer Credit, written in response to the proposed amendment, as
support for the argument that the Commission believed that the interpretation went beyond the
existing Regulation Z. The court, however, found that a careful reading of the letter did not support
this argument. Id. at 199-200.
160. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 665. The court, however, concluded that it was exempt from the APA procedures as a
"rule of agency . . . procedure." Id.
162. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 1113. Professor Davis criticizes this decision, observing that the"court failed to make
the crucial inquiry-whether the Board in issuing the regulation was exercising delegated power to
make rules having force of law." DAvIs, supra note 149, § 7.15, at 72. He concluded that the rule could
not be a legislative rule because the board had no power to make law and that the court thereby
conferred power on the board that Congress had not given. Id. at 73. He further concluded that the
guiding principle should have been: "Any officer who has discretion power necessarily also has the
power to state publicly the manner in which he exercises it, and any such public statement can be
adopted with or without § 553 procedure." Id. Even if it were characterized as an interpretative rule not
subject to APA procedure, he stated that such procedure could have been required by the court on the
theory that fairness required notice and comment procedure. Id. at 74.
164. 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
165. 434 F. Supp. 416 (D.S.C. 1977).
166. See text accompanying notes 178-180 infra (discussion of "substantial impact" test).
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2. The "General Statements of Policy" Exception
Another exception to the APA rulemaking procedures exists for
general statements of agency policy, the parameters of which were
explained by the court in Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.,167 by the following language:
The term "general statements of policy" has been explicated in the Attorney
General's Manual as embracing "statements issued by an agency to advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise
the discretionary power." As this court has had occasion to note, a critical test
of whether a rule is a general statement of policy is its practical effect in a
subsequent administrative proceeding: "A general statement of policy
. . . does not establish a binding norm." It is not finally determinative of
the issues or rights to which it is addressed.
168
At issue in Guardian Federal was a regulation that specified the
criteria to be met in producing satisfactory audit reports for the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The court found the regulation
to be a statement of policy because it preserved the administrator's
discretion by allowing the Chief Examiner to determine "whether an
auditor is satisfactory, whether an audit was conducted in a satisfactory
manner and whether a report of audit is to be accepted.' 69
In addition to the questions whether agency action constitutes a
"particularized mandate"'' 7 0 for the exercise of discretion, or has a "final,
inflexible impact,"'171 several courts also have focused on whether the
action effects some substantial change. In Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power
Commission, 172 for instance, the court held that an order requiring for the
first time that compound interest be paid on amounts ordered refunded
pursuant to the Natural Gas Act was not a "general statement of policy"
because it adopted "a substantive rule imposing such rights and
obligations which an operator has the burden of proving should not apply
167. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
168. Id. at 666. The court noted that:
If it appears that a so-called policy statement is in purpose or likely effect one that narrowly
limits administrative discretion, it will be taken for what it is-a binding rule of substantive
law. . . . The mere existence of some discretion is not sufficient, although it is necessary, for
a rule to be classified as a general statement ofpolicy. . . . A matter ofjudgment is involved
in distinguishing between rules, however discretionary in form, that effectively circumscribe
administrative choice, and rules that contemplate that the administrator will exercise an
informed discretion in the various cases that arise.
Id. at 666-67.
169. Id. at 666. The court emphasized the fact that the criteria were set forth in relation to a
regulation promulgated with conceded procedural regularity authorizing FSLIC to "at any time make,
or cause to be made, an audit of an insured institution" to be conducted "by auditors and in a manner
satisfactory to [FSLIC] in accordance with general policies from time to time established by the
board." 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-I(a)2. See DAVIS, supra note 149, § 7.6, at 32, for discussion of this case.
170. See note 174 infra.
171. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
172. 412 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1969).
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in any waiver or similar proceeding."' 73 Additionally, the court noted that
this provision was not set forth in the section that contained the other
statements of general policy and interpretation. 17
3. The "Rules of Agency Organization,
Procedure, or Practice" Exception
The final exception to the APA procedural requirements exists for
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. According to the
court in Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,175 this exception is
intended to include "technical regulation of the form of agency action and
proceedings 176 and should not include any action that goes beyond
formality or that substantially affects the rights of those over whom the
agency exercises authority.1
77
To avoid the complicated problems in distinguishing between
substantive rules on the one hand and interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, and rules of agency procedure on the other, a number
of courts have taken a more practical approach to whether agency action is
exempt from the notice and comment procedures of the APA. These
courts now decide the issue whether compliance with the APA procedures
is required by determining whether the action has a significant or
substantial impact on those regulated. 178 In Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of
173. Id. at 744.
174. Id. In Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Cal. 1977), the court held that the rules
which imposed an obligation on emergency food stamp applicants and had a substantial impact on
those seeking emergency food stamp certification constituted a "particularized mandate' that had to be
obeyed by the state agencies administering the Fo6d Stamp Program rather than a general policy
statement. See also Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
discussed in note 180 infra.
175. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 1113.
177. Id. The determination of whether a rule is procedural or substantive is by no means a simple
one. According to DAVIs, supra note 149, § 6.29, at 589, this exemption "raises all the difficult problems
of what is substance and what is procedure." Indeed, he questions whether the impact of the rule should
be considered in the determination, stating that:
The most authoritative decision on this question gives an affirmative answer. National Motor
Freight Traffic Assn. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.C.C. 1967), aff'd 393 U.S. 18
(1968). The ICC issued a"Notice" that it had approved a method by which motor carriers and
freight forwarders could informally pay reparations to shippers; no such procedure was
previously available, and the impact on substance was very strong. The district court in an
opinion by Judge McGowan held that the Commission took a significant step in the
implementation of the newly-conferred statutory judicial remedy for reparations when it
instituted the procedure here in question, and that the requirements of § 553 were applicable.
To the argument that the rule was exempt as a procedural rule, the court responded: "The
characterizations 'substantive' and 'procedural' no more here than elsewhere in the law-do
not guide inexorably to the right result, nor do they really advance the inquiry very far." 268
F. Supp. at 96. The Supreme Court's affirmance makes the decision Supreme Court law.
Id. He examines the irreconcilable conclusions reached by some courts on this exemption and
characterizes Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970), as "somewhat
more sophisticated" because of the court's focus on the "impact" of the rule. DAVIs, supra note 147. §
6.29, at 590.
178. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
Professor Davis praised this decision as a "good illustration of the proper use of thesubstantial impact
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Labor,' 1 one example of the use of this theory, the Secretary of Labor had
issued a directive that revoked the schedules of occupations found to be in
short labor supply and thereafter required precertified aliens to submit
proof of specificjob offers and a statement of their qualifications. Focusing
on the substantive effect of the directive, the court found that this
constituted a "rule" subject to APA procedures because it "changed
existing rights and obligations" and had a "substantial impact" upon both
the aliens and the employers by making it more difficult for employers to
fill vacancies in those occupations no longer precertified."80
B. Whether the Regulations Must Be Published After Adoption
Regardless of whether an agency's action constitutes a rule subject to
the APA publish and comment procedures, the Freedom of Information
test" and stated that it has a "leading-case status." DAVIS, supra note 147, § 7.17, at 79. He stated that its
"essential holding"-"one that may be thoroughly sound-is that whether the rules were interpretative
or legislative, their impact was substantial enough that a court should require notice and comment
procedure for issuing them." Id. at 80.
According to Davis, the courts often confuse two ideas in the substantial impact theory: "l)
Substantial impact gives rules force of law. 2) Substantial impact of rules means that an agency should
be required to use notice and comment procedures in issuing them." He cites Lewis-Mota v. Secretary
of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972), as "a good example of confusion of the two ideas." DAVIS, supra
note 147, § 7.16, at 76.
179. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
180. Id. at 482. The court relied on the case of Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942), for this principle.
The Lewis-Mota decision is discussed by Professor Davis at DAvIs, supra note 149, § 7.15, at 74-
76. Professor Davis further states that the reason for the substantial impact rule is the reaction of some
courts to the large scale exemptions from the APA's procedural requirements, observing that many
rules having substantial impact are exempt from the procedural requirements of § 663 in spite of their
vital effect on private interests. Id. at 77.
Despite the drawbacks associated with the exemptions for interpretative rules and general
statements of policy, many commentators believe that they should be retained because they serve the
public interests by encouraging agencies to be more open. See, e.g., Asimow, Public Participation in
the Adoption of Interpretative Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 521,575-84 (1977);
Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and
General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REv. 101, 117-28 (1971). The courts in
Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan. 1978), took an
approach similar to Lewis-Mota. In Energy Reserves, the court noted that the congressional
conference committee expressly required consideration of the impact on the regulated industry and
held that the test for determining whether a rule of order is substantive or interpretative is the language
of the order itself and the language of subsequent proceedings concerning the subject matter of the
order. On the latter issue, the court stated:
Where the order is phrased as a guide to the agency's present views, subject to change, and
with no suggestion these views have the finality or force of substantive regulations; or where
the order has no immediate inflexible impact and is specifically left open to discussion, such
agency orders are deemed to be interpretative.
447 F. Supp. at 1144 (citations omitted). This court, therefore, did not make the common mistake of
confusing the two problems pointed out by Professor Davis: the problem of whether a rule is
interpretative or legislative and the problem of what rulemaking procedure is required since the issues
were treated separately as he suggested. DAVIS, supra note 149, § 7.15, at 76. See Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) in which a ruling was held to be
interpretative despite its substantial impact of denying medical care to millions of poor people without
procedural protection. The majority of the court held that the ruling had no substantial impact.
Professor Davis praised the decision because the court squarely held that impact alone cannot give
rules the force of law and recognized that the common law might require notice and comment
procedure. DAVIS, supra note 149, § 7.17, at 82-83.
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Act (FOIA)"1 requires publication in the Federal Register of certain types
of rules after they have become effective.
182
In light of the earlier discussion, we will briefly examine section
552(a)(1)(D) of the FOIA, which requires publication of "substantive rules
of general applicability," "statements of general policy" and "inter-
pretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency."' 83 In addition, subsection 552(a)(1)(C) requires publication of
agency rules of procedure. 184 The key question concerns the meaning of
"general applicability," since procedures that are not of general ap-
plicability only need be made available for copying. Professor Davis has
observed that the idea of "impact" has been engrafted upon this
description by the court in Lewis v. Weinberger,185 and constitutes a
constructive approach that likely is consistent with congressional intent.
18 6
Examination of two cases may be informative with respect to section
552(a)(1). 8 7 In Aiken v. Obledo,'88 FOIA claims were asserted along with
assertions of invalidity for failure to comply with the APA publish and
comment procedures. Although the analysis of the Aiken court was
somewhat labored, its essential conclusion was that if a rule can be
characterized as an interpretative rule of "general applicability," it must be
published. 8 9 On the issue of "general applicability," the court relied on
Anderson v. Butz,190 and stated that: "An interpretative rule of general
applicability is one which constitutes a change from existing practice and
has a significant impact upon a segment of those regulated."' 9 ' The Aiken
court also held that the rule at issue did not constitute a statement of
agency policy because it was not a "touchstone," but rather constituted a
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
182. Id. § 552(a) & (b) (1976). Section 552 was enacted in 1966 as a replacement for § 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act as enacted in 1946. It became effective in 1967 and was amended in 1974
to include measures designed to compel agency compliance.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976).
186. DAVIS, supra note 149, §5.11, at 343-44. Davis also refers to Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459
(9th Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 194-96 infra.
187. The FOIA is examined in Campbell, Reverse Freedom ofInformation Act Litigation: The
Need for Congressional Action, 67 GEo. L. J. 103, 104-10 (1978).
188. 442 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. 3 1977).
189. 442 F. Supp. at 653. The difficulty in following the analysis is not the fault of the court. but
rather inheres in the statutes. According to DAVIS, supra note 149, § 7.6, at 32:
Four terms in §§ 552 and 553 can probably be differentiated, but doing so with precision
seems unpromising. Are "statements of general policy" the same as or different from "general
statements of policy"? The first term appears in § 552(a)(1)(D). and the second in §
553(b)(3)(A). The word "general" in those two phrases distinguishes them from two other
phrases-"those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agency and are not published in the Federal Register" in § 552(a)(2)(B), and "interpretative
rules and statements of policy" in§ 553(d)(2). Of course, the meanings of such statutory terms
have to come largely from the contexts of the problems of interpretation.
190. 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
191. 442 F. Supp. at 653.
[Vol. 41:401
1980] BACK PAY AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 431
"particularized mandate," which compelled obedience by the state
agencies.
1 92
After determining that the rule was not a statement of policy or an
interpretative rule, the court concluded that it was either a procedural rule
or a substantive rule, and that, in either event, publication was required.
Since the rule had not been published, the court held that the agency had
violated FOIA by implementing a rule which had not been published in
final form and, therefore, declared the rule to be invalid.
193
In Anderson v. Butz,194 a regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture
that required that certain housing subsidies paid by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development be treated as income for food stamp
purposes was alleged to be invalid on both procedural and substantive
grounds under the APA publish and comment procedure and FOIA. The
court squarely rejected the government's contention that the instruction
fell within the purview of the provisions requiring availability only for
public inspection and copying. The court stated that there was a significant
difference between the rules and statements of policy that affects only the
internal operations or actions of an agency and those that affect the
substantive rights of others outside the agency. 195 The court thus held that
because the instruction had a significant effect on food stamp recipients
and its effect would be widespread and immediate, compliance with the
APA procedures was required.
196
C. Examination of OFCCP's Action with Respect to Back Pay Relief
The foregoing detailed examination of exemptions has been
presented for two purposes: first, it will serve as background for a
discussion of OFCCP's back pay policy and regulations; and second, it
demonstrates the "fuzziness" that pervades the area. Thus, it is hoped that
the reader can properly assess the authors' conclusions. The following
discussion assumes that the Executive Order conferred upon OFCCP the
authority to create the back pay relief policy and regulations embodying it
and focuses on whether the policy and regulations were properly
promulgated. 19
7
192. Id. In so doing the court relied on Ashgrove Cement Co. v. FTC, 519 F.2d 934,935 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). in which the court held that a "policy determination" denotes a final agency decision which
is utilized as a "touchstone for future administrative action."
193. Id. at 654. This same approach, i.e., reliance on lack of publication for finding a rule to be
interpretative, was utilized in Thomas v. County Office Comm. of Cameron County, 327 F. Supp.
1244. 1253 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
194. 428 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
195. Id. at 249.
196. Id. at 250. In Anderson, the Court of Appeals held that even though recipients received
actual notice of the instruction at the time they sought the injunction, it did not constitute the "timely
notice" contemplated by Congress. 550 F.2d at 463. The court, however, did not explain how it knew
what Congress intended by "actual notice" when required prior to a person's being adversely affected
by an unpublished rule.
197. It is further assumed that, because of the substantial likelihood such a theory would be
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First, we shall discuss whether OFCCP's policy of requiring back pay
from government contractors for affected class members, which,
according to it, has been in existence since at least 1967,198 constituted a
"rule" that would have been subject to the APA publish and comment
procedures in the absence of the contract exemption. The operational
premise is that the policy would have constituted a rule unless it was
exempt as an interpretative rule or a general statement of policy. 199
1. Exemption as an Interpretative Rule
A question exists whether, prior to the inclusion by OFCCP of the
phrase "back pay" in the regulations in 1977, OFCCP's interpretation of
the word "relief" to include back pay was entitled to be given the force of
law. It is possible that OFCCP's back pay policy would have satisfied the
first determinative factor necessary for exemption as an interpretative
rule-that since it was not set forth in the regulations, it was not intended
to have the full force and effect of law.
It is more probable, however, that OFCCP had the opposite intent.
First, OFCCP was delegated the authority to make substantive rules.
Moreover, even though the back pay policy allegedly was created before
the regulations mandating "relief' were promulgated, it must be assumed
for analytical purposes that OFCCP intended to embody that policy in
Revised Order No. 4, added in 1971 .200 The Revised Order, which
expressly referred to "relief," obviously was intended to have the full force
and effect of law.20 ' Based on this assumption, it is probable that, at least
since 1971, the policy was intended to have the force and effect of law.
Finally, the effect of the policy compels this conclusion. The policy would
be enforced by finding a contractor who fails to include back pay in a
conciliation agreement upon demand to be in noncompliance. Thus,
government contractors would be subject to the same sanctions and
penalties as would apply had they violated other substantive provisions of
Executive Order 11246 or the regulations. 0 2
The conclusion that the policy would not be exempt as an
interpretative rule is not undercut by Continental Oil v. Burns.203 Unlike
rejected, exemption as a rule of agency procedure would not be used as a justification for failure to
comply with the publish and comment procedures. For discussion of this exemption, see text
accompanying notes 175-80 supra.
198. This statement was probably made in order to gain judicial deference to the policy as a
contemporaneous interpretation of the Executive Order. See discussion in note 150 supra.
199. For analytical purposes the contracts exemption is not discussed for the reasons set forth in
footnote 146.
200. Otherwise, we find ourselves with a policy that OFCCP did not attempt to promulgate for
nine years after its formulation in 1967.
201. See letter from Phillip J. Davis, Acting Director of OFCCP to Mr. Marion A. Bowden,
Assistant to the General Manager for Equal Employment Opportunity. April 6. 1973. attached as
Exhibit C to Response of Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation v. Dunlop. No. 75-0597 (D.C. 1975).
202. See text accompanying note 23 supra for a discussion of this issue.
203. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
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the situation in that case, the announcement of the back pay policy did not
precede the effective date of the regulation. Indeed, government
contractors had no way of knowing that the policy existed until March 26,
1975, when OFCCP published for comment proposed guidelines
expressing its interpretation.0 4 The back pay policy had not been set forth
in Revised Order No. 4, which had been promulgated in 1971.205
Thus, from October 24, 1965, when OFCCP adopted as temporary
regulations the "rules, regulations, orders, instructions, and other
directives, issued by the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity '20 6 until the proposed guidelines were issued for comment,
government contractors had no notice of the back pay policy.20 7 The fact
that eight years elapsed before OFCCP published the policy for comment
clearly distinguishes these facts from those in Continental Oil.
Consequently, the policy interpreting "relief" to mandate the in-
clusion of a "make whole" remedy, if found appropriate by OFCCP, ef-
fected a drastic change in the existing law. Moreover, because "relief"
could be sought for a period of time that preceded the date on which notice
of this obligation was given, the new interpretation would be given a
retroactive effect, the absence of which the Continental Oil court found
determinative.20 8 Furthermore, unlike American Bancorporation, Inc. v.
Board of Governors,20 9 the effect of the interpretation was, in fact, to
broaden the term "relief" rather than to narrow it. Nor would the changed
meaning of the term have fallen within the purview of National Restaurant
Association v. Simon210 as merely imposing a new reporting requirement,
since it potentially exposed government contractors to the payment of
relief amounting to millions of dollars.21 ' Such a drastic change could not
be effected by an interpretative rule.
Thus, because of the drastic change that it effected in the law, coupled
with its substantial impact upon government contractors, OFCCP's
interpretation of relief would probably not have been exempt from the
APA procedures as an interpretative rule at the time of its formulation in
1967. Consequently, OFCCP's action in failing to publish it for comment
204. 40 Fed. Reg. 13,311 (1975). The strong opposition to the guidelines is confirmation of this
fact.
205. These regulations were promulgated after the effective date of the waiver of the contracts
exemption on July 10, 1971, 41 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1971). Thus, it may be argued that the policy must have
been included in the initial Revised Order to be enforceable since, as the authors have concluded, it was
not exempt from the publish and comment procedures.
206. 30 Fed. Reg. 13,441 (1965).
207. The fact that the guidelines were never formally adopted may have lulled contractors into a
belief that OFCCP did not intend to continue the policy since its authority to do so had been
questioned and the guidelines had met with strong opposition.
208. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
209. 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974).
210. 411 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C. 1976).
211. See text accompanying note 21 supra (indication of magnitude of potential exposure).
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would fall squarely within the ambit of Reyes v. Klein,212 and the
interpretation would be invalid and unenforceable.
Moreover, despite the contracts exemption, and even if the back pay
policy had been within the interpretative rule exception, notions of
fundamental fairness may well have led to a judicial requirement that the
policy be expressly stated when it was implemented. As indicated earlier,
Revised Order No. 4 was adopted shortly after the contracts waiver, and
was amended in 1975. Given the impact of that Order, OFCCP may well
have been required, at least at the time of its initial promulgation in 1971,
to set forth its interpretation as part of the rule. Even if it is accepted that
the interpretation itself, which was allegedly created prior to the contracts
waiver, would not have had to be repromulgated after the waiver even if it
constituted a substantive rule, because that interpretation constituted an
integral part of the Revised Order that was promulgated after the contracts
waiver, and because it would have a substantial impact, it should have been
included as part of the order were it to be enforced by OFCCP.2 3
2. Exemption as a General Statement of Policy
Assuming that the policy originally implemented in 1967 was identical
to that promulgated in Revised Order No. 4 in 1971,214 except that in the
Revised Order OFCCP included its own interpretation of the word
"relief," the back pay policy probably would not have been exempt from
the APA's publish and comment procedures as a "general statement of
policy" because there was no indication that the definition of the term
"relief" in the Revised Order was subject to OFCCP's discretion.21 5 Nor
does the incorporation of the section 60-2.2 requirements for an
"acceptable affirmative action program" add any element of discretion2 16
212. See'text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
213. In Legal Aid Soe'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), the court did not decide
whether Technical Guidance Memo No. I was "a legislative rule having a substantial impact upon the
rights and obligations of federal contractors, and was invalid because not issued pursuant to the
rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553." The district court had held that reference to it had not been
necessary in reaching a decision. The Memo, which gave guidance on the "proper interpretation" of
certain selected issues regarding Revised Order 4, was claimed to be exempt as an interpretative rule. It
should be noted that this case has implications for OFCCP's manual, discussed in text accompanying
notes 94-116 supra.
214. There was no comparable section in Order No. 4,41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1(1971), published in35
Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970).
215. The pertinent language was:
Relief for members of an "affected class" who, by virtue of past discrimination, continue to
suffer the present effects of that discrimination must either be included in the contractor's
affirmative action program or be embodied in a separate written "corrective action" program.
An "affected class" problem must be remedied in order for a contractor to be considered in
compliance. Section 60-2.2 herein pertaining to an acceptable affirmative action program is
also applicable to the failure to remedy discrimination against members of an"affected class."
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (1972). According to the Court in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Marshall: "Section 60-
2. 1(b) merely provides that a contractor has not complied with the Order as long as he has an'affected
class' problem. But a hearing on the merits is necessary to determine whether he actually has an affected
class problem." 601 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1979).
216. In Legal Aid Society, it is interesting to note that the court implied that "questions as
to ...what should be done to secure compliance once it is determined that a contractor has violated
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since the parameters of "acceptability" are tied to sections 60-2.10 through
60-2.32, which contain no reference to relief.
In Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Savings
& Loan Insurance Corp.,1 7 the court held that the rule involved there was
exempt as a policy statement because it had been promulgated in
connection with a regulation that preserved the administrator's discretion
with respect to the new rule. The absence of this factor probably would be
determinative in the instant situation. As promulgated, Revised Order No.
4 failed to preserve OFCCP's discretion to require relief in the nature of
corrective action.1 8
Moreover, as in Texaco, Inc.219 and Aiken, 22 attention in the instant
situation probably would have focused upon whether the inclusion of the
phrase effected a substantial change in existing law or had a substantial
impact on government contractors. The inclusion effected both results.
Indeed, the impact of OFCCP's action paralleled that of a rule rejected as a
policy statement in Texaco, Inc., in which the challenged agency action
potentially entailed large sums of money.22 l Thus, the OFCCP policy
probably would not have been exempt from the publish and comment
procedures as a statement of policy. For these same reasons, the policy
would probably not have been exempt under the "substantial impact"
test.
22
It is, of course, arguable that the back pay policy would have been
exempt from the publish and comment procedures as a policy statement.
The argument would be predicated on the assumption that the back pay
policy as originally implemented was not the same as that set forth in a
Revised Order No. 4, but rather was expressly included in the phrase
"where appropriate," which was subsequently added in 1977. That phrase
would arguably have maintained the administrator's discretion, as required
by the courts in Guardian Federal223 and Noel v. Chapman,224 and would
his affirmative action obligations (to which the conciliation provisions are directed)" are a matter of
discretion for which a mandamus action is appropriate. 608 F.2d at 1331. Theauthors have no quarrel
with this conclusion inasmuch as it does not state that the discretion is unbridled. Our contention is
simply that the parameters of the term "relief" are set forth in other provisions of the regulations which
are, inter alia. limited to corrective action. These parameters were implicitly recognized by the Legal
Aid Society court. Id.
217. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
218. See Note, Recovery of Back Pay Under Executive Order 11,246, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 767,
772-76 (1979) in which the author states that even in the Standard Compliance Review Report: "The
emphasis, to the extent discernible in the Report, appeared to be on promotion or transfer, back pay
was not mentioned." Id. at 776.
219. See text accompanying notes 172-74 supra.
220. See note 174 supra.
221. The Federal Power Commission's new rule requiring compound interest on the amounts
ordered refunded pursuant to the Natural Gas Act was held not to be a general policy statement
because it adopted a substantative rule imposing rights and obligations that had to be disproved by the
operator in a waiver or similar proceeding. Similarly, the inappropriateness of back pay would have to
be established by government contractors with OFCCP's action.
222. See text accompanying notes 18 1-85 supra (discussion of "substantial impact" test).
223. See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 170-72 supra.
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have prevented characterization of the policy as a "particularized
mandate." These words also may well have answered any argument that
the inclusion of the policy had a "final, inflexible impact" upon
government contractors. Inasmuch as the Revised Order was added after
the policy was created, however, it seems more logical to conclude that the
existing policy was embodied therein and that OFCCP's further
amendments reflect refinement and development of the policy. For this
reason, the authors have assumed that the policy implemented in 1967 was
the same as that set forth in the 1971 regulations.
Thus, the authors have concluded that the back pay policy probably
would have been subject to the APA procedures but for the contracts
exemption. Still, the fact that repromulgation of existing rules was not
required after waiver of that exemption arguably does not relieve OFCCP
of liability for improper promulgation of the policy because (1) the Revised
Order, through which the back pay policy would be implemented, was not
adopted until after the waiver and (2) the Revised Order was the subject of
an amendment in 1974. Moreover, OFCCP's reliance upon either the
interpretative rule or policy statement exemption may have subjected it to
225the court's scorn.
Finally, regardless of whether compliance with the publish and
comment procedures was required, FOIA probably mandated publica-
tion. As indicated earlier, the test of general applicability of the FOIA
publication rules turns on the impact of the rule. On this basis, publication
of the policy probably was required as either a statement of general policy,
a substantive rule of general applicability, or an interpretation of general
applicability.
3. The Validity of Inclusion of the Phrase in
the 1977 Regulations
In 1976, the OFCCP published proposed regulations in furtherance of
its duties pursuant to Executive Order 11246. These proposed regulations
did not include the phrase "including back pay where appropriate" in its
outline of possible remedial provisions in conciliation agreements. The
regulations as adopted in 1977 did include this phrase.226 Having
concluded that the back pay policy is not exempt from the APA
procedures, the question that arises is whether this omission rendered
invalid its inclusion in the final regulations.
Clearly, the effect of the addition of the back pay phrase is
determinative of the issue. Indeed, based on the prior conclusions on the
225. In Spring Mills, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 434 F. Supp. 416 (D.S.C. 1977),
the court rejected the Commission's action in declaring an article a "banned hazardous substance'
without compliance with the proper steps, stating: "That any agency of the United States Government
should try to hide such far reaching and drastic measures under the label of an 'interpretation' is
scandalous. . . .Their action is the most flagrant misbranding imaginable." Id. at 430.
226. See discussion in note II supra.
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applicability of the APA procedures and in the absence of other factors, no
further discussion would be required. Other factors, however, do exist.
One of the proposed regulations expressly provided that back pay
constituted an appropriate remedy to be sought in administrative and
judicial enforcement proceedings. Whether this provision mitigated the
effect of non-inclusion of the back pay phrase in the proposed regulation
thus is squarely presented.
Because the policy of providing for back pay relief in administrative
and judicial enforcement proceedings is significantly different from that of
providing for it in a conciliation agreement,2 7 it appears that the inclusion
of the provision relating to adjudicatory proceedings did not abrogate the
need to comply with the APA publish and comment procedures with
• 228
respect to the amendment of the conciliation agreement section. It may
be argued that the APA requirements do not apply because the procedure
creates no substantive right, since it extends only to those who choose to
use it. This argument, however, failed in National Motor Freight, in which
the court stated: "A right to avail oneself of an administrative adjudication
of this kind does not become trivial simply because it is optional.,,229 Nor
does the importance of informal settlement procedures as an adjunct to the
judicial and administrative schemes provided by the Order constitute a
basis for upholding the inclusion of the back pay provision in the
conciliation agreement regulation. On this point, the National Motor
Freight court stated:
The Commission was . . under no injunction from Congress to provide
such a supplement. It would not have been derelict in any way vis-a-vis
Congress if it had concluded to act only in the ancillary role explicitly defined
in the amendments to the Act. Its decision to anticipate voluntary settlement
before resort to the courts . . .was not a necessary consequence of the
change in law. Whether the Commission should have taken that decision at
all, and, if so, what the precise form and scope of the procedure should be,
were questions suitable for exploration and informal rule making. The
Commission now assures us that what it did was important to the proper
implementation of the statutory scheme forjudicial reparations. But that very
quality of importance-to the industry and to the public-is what lies at the
base of Section4 of the APA and which informs the Congressional purpose in
that law to expose proposed agency action by general rule to the test of prior
examination and comment by the affected parties.230
The action of OFCCP with respect to back pay clearly falls within the
ambit of the National Motor Freight decision. First, it is not clear that the
Order conferred any right to back pay. Second, the express language of the
Order only provides a judicial avenue for such relief. Third, because the
major function of OFCCP is overseeing compliance with affirmative
227. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
228. 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.C. 1967), aff'd 393 U.S. 18 (1968).
229. Id. at 96.
230. Id.
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action obligations, and not calculating back pay awards, the decision
concerning back pay is not a "routine determination" of that agency.
Fourth, the Order did not obligate, or indeed permit, OFCCP to act as an
adjunct to the judicial procedure."' And finally, having proposed these
procedures initially in the 1975 guidelines, OFCCP obviously considers
them to be important.
As stated earlier, the court in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Marshall
232
expressly held that a hearing on the merits is necessary to determine
whether an affected class problem exists for which relief in a conciliation
agreement could be sought. Once a hearing is required, resort to a
conciliation agreement ceases to serve the "informal settlement" function.
The authors thus conclude that the phrase was invalidly included in the
conciliation agreement section of the final regulations. 33 Consequently,
it is arguable that even after the 1977 regulations, only "corrective" action
could be required in conciliation agreements.
Moreover, the fact that OFCCP dropped its proposal to add a
subsection to section 60-1.24, which deals solely with written conciliation
agreements, coupled with the consideration that the explanatory
comments accompanying the final rules did not even mention the inclusion
of the back pay phrase, might well have misled contractors, and thus
supports the authors' conclusion. It is, of course, arguable that since the
231. In fact, a referral to the Dept. ofJustice or to the EEOC is all that is permitted by the Order.
See § 209.
232. 601 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 82-94 supra.
233. A contention that settlement through a conciliation agreement is voluntary and thus the
effect of the inclusion is minor does not pass muster. In National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D. D.C. 1967), aff'd, 383 U.S. 18 (1968), the Interstate Commerce
Commission's arguments along these lines were given short shrift by the court, even though the merits
of the issue were not reached. The court stated:
The Commission casts its argument in the form that the "right to reparations is conferred by
statute, and the notice itself confers no new substantive right on any party . . . it merely
provides a procedure which may be voluntarily used" to settle reparation claims. Of course,
whether Congress has conferred by statute any "right to reparations" whatsoever through
purely administrative means is the precise issue raised by plaintiffs in theirsubmission on the
merits. We have, as indicated above, not thought it necessary to reach the merits in this case
because, even if we were to decide that the Commission is not foreclosed by any
Congressional or other restraint from doing what it did, we would still be of the view that
Section 4 was applicable and should have been observed. That agency action falls within the
permissible scope of statutory authority does not alone answer the question of the
applicability of Section 4.
It is, in any event, clear that Congress did not in express terms in the 1965 amendments
provide more than a judicial avenue to reparations. It may be that, properly viewed, this
limitation did not proscribe the informal and voluntary administrative procedures at issue
here, but this assumed authority on the part of the Commission to act does not mean that its
action is so insignificant in nature and impact as to fall outside the rulemaking requirements
of Section 4.
The reverse would, indeed, appear to be true. Even assuming the power, the decision by
the Commission to make its administrative processes and expertise available for a regular
course of finding formerly effective rates to be illegal in order that rebates may be made
without violating the statutory prohibitions upon discrimination, that decision, we repeat,
is hardly a routine determination in the discharge of the Commission's important functions.
as witness the critical importance which the Commission itself now attributes to this device.
Id. at 95-96.
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insertion of the phrase in section 60-2.1 achieved the same result as the
proposed subsection, the notice requirement was met. However, based on
notions of fundamental fairness and in light of the substantial impact of
this regulation, strict compliance with the APA requirements should be
required. Therefore, OFCCP should not be permitted to prevail. 4
If, in fact, the policy of inclusion of back pay relief in conciliation
agreements was not validly promulgated in the 1977 regulations, and if this
policy was not exempt from the publish and comment procedures, then
assuming the substantive nexus, it follows that the policy was first validly
incorporated into section 60-1.33, effective on January 28, 1980.235
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the authors have concluded that the
regulations authorizing the collection of back pay by OFCCP in extra-
judicial proceedings are invalid and illegal. It is hoped that OFCCP will
voluntarily reexamine its regulations on these issues. In the alternative, it is
desirable that a contractor will fight the agency through the requisite
judicial processes to reach a final ruling.
234. The remedies available to contractors who relied to their detriment upon improperly
promulgated rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
235. 44 Fed. Reg. 77,000 (1979).

